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ABSTRACT 
The availability heuristic is a strategy that people use to make 
quick decisions but often lead to systematic errors. We propose 
three ways that visualization could facilitate unbiased decision-
making. First, visualizations can alter the way our memory stores 
the events for later recall, so as to improve users' long-term 
intuitions. Second, the known biases could lead to new 
visualization guidelines. Third, we suggest the design of decision-
making tools that are inspired by heuristics, e.g. suggesting 
intuitive approximations, rather than target to present exhaustive 
comparisons of all possible outcomes, or automated solutions for 
choosing decisions.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.2  [Information Interfaces and Presentation]: User Inter- 
faces - Graphical user interfaces 
General Terms 
Design, Human Factors 
Keywords 
Availability Heuristic, Cognitive Bias, Visualizations, Decision-
Making  
1. INTRODUCTION 
We all want to make good decisions.  However, decision-
making judgments often involve approximate estimations of 
probabilities and frequencies. In order to reduce the complexity of 
estimation people rely on a limited number of strategies. One of 
these strategies is called Availability Heuristic [14]. 
The availability heuristic is a rule of thumb in which decision 
makers “estimate the frequency or probability by the ease with 
which instances or associations could be brought to mind”[20]. 
For example, news about a terrible plane crash may temporarily 
alter our feelings on flight safety. This heuristic simplifies some 
otherwise very difficult judgments, and it is usually effective since 
in principle it is easier to recall or imagine common events than 
uncommon ones. 
However, apart from the actual frequency or probability, 
other factors affect the ease of recalling instances, and thus 
estimating frequencies for making decisions. Some of these 
factors affecting recall, illustrated by Tversky and Kahneman 
[21], often lead to systematic errors: 
- Bias due to retrievability of instances: People evaluate the 
probability of an event as higher, when they retrieve its instances 
effortlessly. Schwarz et al [16] asked one group of participants to 
recall 12 examples of their past assertive behavior, and another 
group to recall only 6. After that, they rated their assertiveness. 
The 12 examples were harder to be recalled than the 6, so the first 
group rated themselves as less assertive than the second group. 
Retrievability is often related to a) familiarity [20] or what 
Whittlesea [23] refers to as the "illusion of pastness"; b) saliency 
where one instance elicits more attention than another [18]; and c) 
recency where for example the serial presentation of information 
may affect memorization [22]. 
- Bias due to the effectiveness of the search set: The 
generation of a search set depends also on the performed search 
task. When we ask to compare the instances of the word ‘love' 
with the word ‘door’ the first seems more frequent. A main reason 
for this is that besides the comparison of words, there is a hidden 
task of recalling contexts in which these words appear. It is 
generally easier to recall abstract contexts than concrete ones [8]. 
- Bias of imaginability: When the frequency of an instance is 
not stored in memory, we sometimes generate this frequency 
according to some rule.  For example when we want to estimate 
which is more frequent, the existence of committees of 8 members 
or of 2, we will mentally construct committees and rate them by 
the ease of this construction. The mental construction of 2 
member committees is easier, and thus may be considered as most 
frequent [20]. In real life imaginability biases can lead us to 
overestimate some risks with vivid scenarios and underestimate 
dangerous risks that are hard to conceive. 
- Bias due to illusory correlation: When two events co-occur 
people tend to overestimate the frequency of natural association. 
For example it is common to patients with paranoia to have 
peculiar eyes. This association misled undergraduate clinicians to 
diagnose as paranoid patients with no other symptoms related to 
paranoia in their medical data, simply because they were guided 
by a given picture of the patient with peculiar eyes [4][5]. 
Availability bias affects the decision-making ability in an 
unconscious way, and can lead people to irrational decisions. We 
believe we can better support decision-making, through the design 
of visualizations that take into account these factors that influence 
decision-making. We illustrate this in a voting scenario that we 
imagine takes place with and without hypothetical visualizations 
designed to account for biases. 
2. THE VOTING DECISION 
Imagine that one needs to decide which political candidate to 
vote for. There are three steps. As a first step, she shapes an 
opinion on which are the important personal and society issues 
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based on her past exposure to information (media, social 
environment, personal experiences etc.). Second, she investigates 
the candidates’ former actions, background and current positions, 
and estimates their ability and willingness to solve the important 
society issues. Finally, she compares all the alternatives and 
decides on a candidate.  
In an ideal world, voters are aware of their position in the 
complex political landscape, understand statistical analysis data 
and micro-macro economics, and have endless memory capacity 
and time to process all the relative candidates’ history. In reality, 
voters usually simplify this decision using heuristics. However, as 
we discussed, the common heuristics like availability may lead 
one to pick a candidate according to, for example: meaningless 
actions that media over-cover, without important impact in the 
society [6]; the sequence of their presentation in the public debate 
[12]; the vividness of the way they talk [15][13][2] or even 
whether their victory is an event easy to envision [3].  
3. INFOVIS ON A COMPLEX DECISION 
The actual challenge on the three decision-making steps in 
the voting problem is how to filter, understand, recall and 
compare information. In principle, this challenge is related to the 
infovis objectives. But how could visualizations actually assist a 
voter to reduce availability biases? 
Visualizations to aid recall: Let’s think of a scenario with simple 
hypothetical visualizations involved in the voting problem. 
Consider also two alternative policies: a consolidation of the 
national health system focusing on cancer cure, and a high-cost 
terrorism counteraction. People tend to make wrong estimations 
on most probable causes of death in their country [7], misled by 
media. In contrast, imagine the voter had access to a map with 
stacked (men/women) bar charts of death causes (society issues 
awareness) that she can filter. For the simplicity of the argument 
here we assume a voter who wants to maximize her own self-
interest. Thus, the displayed causes can be filtered according to 
her family’s medical records and other individual characteristics 
(personal issues awareness). The user interacts with the 
visualization, composing a view that is focused on her interests. 
From the amount of information that she was able to process, she 
captures a snapshot of her self-constructed view of the 
visualization to save among her personal notes.  In the last step of 
the decision-making, she evaluates the policies of each candidate. 
Based on her memorable interaction experience with the 
visualization, she intuitively evaluates which election promise has 
greater impact in her life.  
Visualizations could thus educate decision makers to develop 
unbiased intuitions of their surroundings. However, as we saw in 
the previous example, this does not only imply visual comparisons 
of choices and consequences. The availability heuristic succeeds 
when memory stores the frequent events in an easy-to-recall way. 
In our example, the visualization facilitates the user’s memory by 
capturing her self-constructed summary. Thus, visualizations 
could go beyond simply showing all possible alternatives. 
Visualizations should also help decision makers easily recall the 
important take-away information.  
Visualizations to remove biases: So visualizations can help deal 
with biases. But visualization designers can also reuse the 
knowledge of robust biases already studied in psychology 
literature to make better visualizations. Studies on how the 
candidates’ order in the set of ballot papers affects the vote rank, 
confirm that “recency effect” [22] occurs also in visualizations 
[24]. Thus visualizations can reinforce the importance of some 
information due to some known biases (e.g., presenting them last).  
Moreover, if the magnitude of a visual variable does not reflect its 
real impact, we may reinforce not only visual perception bias 
(bigger is more important), but also retrievability biases  (bigger 
may be easier to remember). For example, consider the two 
political candidates suggest either the increase of unemployment 
allowance, or the tax exemption of families with a lot of children. 
Both are fair measures, but unemployment applies to a larger part 
of the population. However, families with many children may not 
be able to survive with the current tax policy.  A visualization 
where the visual variable depends exclusively on the population 
size is legible, but may lead voters to evaluate the policies only 
according to the population criterion, even for voters who have 10 
children themselves. Visualizations, in addition to what the media 
can offer, should be able to also display a customized perspective 
and alternative views of the data. These customized views of the 
data will be the ones most likely retrieved from their memory 
during the decision process.  
The visualization design should also take into account the 
biases due to imaginability. When it comes to radical ideas, the 
mind’s inability to construct the outcome of this idea can lead a 
person to consider it as impossible to happen. In the voting 
problem, if a candidate proposes “decentralization of state power 
to local communities”, the voters may reject it not only because 
they disagree, but also because the outcome is an event hard to 
envision. A conceptualized, but vivid, map representation of the 
idea of decentralization could alter the voter’s willingness to 
accept a change. 
Visualizations inspired by heuristics: We mostly discussed so far 
how to present the information to lead to effective and unbiased 
decisions. However, the decision-making process itself can be 
hard even when all the information we need is available. 
Automated decision-making tools that give explicit answers 
according to probability computations, may not always feel 
intuitive and understandable even by experts [9]. They often 
restrict users by expecting a very particular input, or ignoring 
other context-relevant information that the users may have [19]. 
On the other hand common visualization tools often hide 
uncertainty in the data [17] [1] and do not actually shield decision 
makers against perceptual and cognitive biases [10][14][11] 
Visualization tools are currently designed and evaluated based on 
data retrieval and insight tasks, rather than on the ultimate and 
crucial task of decision-making [1]. Thus we could drive some 
inspiration of how heuristic strategies like availability, simplify 
decision tasks, find the effective tradeoff among simplicity and 
accuracy, and apply this analogy on new visualization tools. That 
is, decision tools may need to allow some imperfection for the 
sake of understandability.  
4. CONCLUSION 
 
We discussed so far how information visualization could 
eliminate biases due to availability, when we visualize the actual 
probabilities, rearrange the sequence of information, increase their 
saliency or filter a subset of them for later recall. While designing 
such systems, our goal should not be to eliminate the use of 
heuristics that can cause these biases altogether, but rather to 
exploit them helping users make better decisions. 
 To sum up, we suggest that information visualization can reduce 
availability biases and assist decision-making in three ways. First, 
we can take advantage of the good use of availability heuristics 
and improve users' long-term intuitions. Second, visualizations 
could provide design techniques that eliminate the known 
availability biases. Third, we can investigate new decision-making 
tools that target to inspired by rather than replace the way that 
availability heuristics work. 
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